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Which Roads (if any) to Social Investment?
The Recalibration of EU Welfare States at
the Crisis Crossroads (2000–2014)
STEFANO RONCHI




The social investment approach has been advocated as a blueprint for recasting European
welfare states since the years of the Lisbon Strategy. After the Euro crisis squeezed the fiscal
space available for welfare recalibration, the question has been raised as to whether social
investment couldwithstand the economic turmoil. Relyingon anewwelfare expenditure dataset
constructed from various Eurostat sources, this article looks at the budgetary recalibration of
27 EU welfare states from the launch of the Lisbon Strategy to the aftermath of the Euro
crisis (2000 to 2014). It compares the financial efforts that governments have put into social
investment- and social protection-oriented policies, highlighting the different trajectories taken
by EU welfare states at the crisis crossroads. Four scenarios for welfare recalibration are put
forward, based on the social investment perspective and its critiques. The results show that the
overall progress made by social investment in welfare budgets since 2000 came to a halt with
the outbreak of the crisis. Bleaker scenarios materialised, whereas EU welfare states pursued
retrenchment rather than investment, or had to face harsher budgetary trade-offs, expanding
social investment to the detriment of social protection.
Introduction
The idea of social investment has influenced the debate on how to recast EU
welfare states since the years of the Lisbon Strategy (Esping-Andersen et al.,
2002). With the launch of the Social Investment Package in 2013, the European
Commission explicitly endorsed this blueprint (European Commission, 2013a,
2013d). A so-called Social Compact followed, calling for a more effective and
efficient use of welfare state budgets along the imperatives of social investment
(European Commission, 2013c). Still, with the exception of Nordic countries,
employment-centred social investment policies are poorly financed in the bulk
of member states. ‘Old’ social protection programmes take the lion’s share of
social expenditure, leaving little space for investments in new social policies
(Hudson and Kuhner, 2009; Nikolai, 2012).
In the aftershocks of the financial crisis, the question was raised as to
whether the social investment strategy could withstand the economic turmoil
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(Van Kersbergen andHemerijck, 2012). After the crisis began, austerity tightened
the constraints on national economic policies, further reducing the budgetary
space for welfare state recalibration. Although some general expansion of
social investment spending was observed in the years prior to the Euro crisis
(Vandenbroucke and Vleminckx, 2011; Kuitto, 2016), we know little about more
recent developments. Today’s context of scarcer resources potentially exacerbates
the trade-off between spending for old protection-oriented and new investment-
oriented programmes (Cantillon, 2011; Streeck and Mertens, 2011; Breunig and
Busemeyer, 2012). Moreover, it makes it harder for those countries which had
not invested in new policies before to catch up. There is no agreement on the
trajectory taken by EU welfare states in the aftermath of the crisis. On one hand,
some scholars argue that in most countries social investment has been pursued
despite prima facie cost-containment policy priorities (Van Kersbergen et al.,
2014).On theother hand, especiallywhere austerity is bitingharder, retrenchment
rather than investment seems to be the rule (Petmesidou and Guille´n, 2014), and
worries about further divergence between EU welfare states have been raised
(Kvist, 2013). Not all member states would have been able to afford the social
investment strategy: at the crisis crossroads, some could have taken cheaper
paths.
This article looks at howwelfare state budgets were recalibrated in the EU-27
(all member states except Croatia) from the launch of the Lisbon Strategy in 2000
to 2014, through the crisis time. Building on the social investment perspective
and its critiques, it develops four theoretical scenarios for the recalibration of
welfare state budgets. The analysis is based on the Social Investment Welfare
Expenditure (SIWE) data set (Ronchi, 2016): a new data set built on Eurostat
sources, which provides a fine-grained disaggregation of social spending. Instead
of looking at raw spending-over-the-GDP figures, the analysis relies on needs-
adjusted indicators of the effective ‘budgetary effort’ (spending per potential
beneficiary) put into selected welfare programmes by governments. This allows
us to track the progress of two fundamental dimensions of today’s welfare states –
social investment and social protection – in public budgets. Did all member
states increase resources over social investment-oriented programmes despite the
tightenedfiscal space?Were the investment andprotectiondimensions competing
with each other into narrower welfare state budgets? Based on the trajectories
of recalibration observed empirically, each member state is placed in one of the
theoretical scenarios.
The results partly depart from previous findings that highlighted an
expansion of social investment spending before the crisis (Vandenbroucke and
Vleminckx, 2011; Kuitto, 2016). In the crisis aftermath, the general progress of
social investment in public budgets came to a halt, and the fiscal trade-off between
investment- and protection-oriented policies also became critical. This adds
evidence to what has been pointed out in some recent policy reports (Bouget
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et al., 2015; Natali and Vanhercke, 2015): in most EU member states, social policy
objectives seem to have been overwhelmed by fiscal consolidation. Overall, the
economic crisis stands out as a critical juncture which has opened up bleaker
prospects for the recalibration of EU welfare states.
The article is structured as follows. The next section reviews the literature
on the social investment perspective applied to the analysis of welfare state
budgets. We then outline the context of the Euro crisis, which the social
investment strategyhas to face.The fourth sectiondraws four scenarios forwelfare
recalibration, based on different streams of literature. The SIWE data set and the
methodology used for tracking budgetary welfare efforts are presented in the fifth
section. The results section matches the empirical findings with the theoretical
scenarios. Thefinal section concludes by elaboratingonboth analytical andpolicy
implications.
Social investment and welfare state budgets
The social investment perspective is becoming the most prominent key for
understanding the ongoing change of advanced welfare states (Jenson, 2012).
In its frame, the rationale of the new welfare state shifts from the sole protection
of people frommarket risks, to their empowermentwithin themarket. The former
objective is served by long-established social programmes such as unemployment
benefits and pensions; cash benefits whose aim is to compensate those out of
work for some kind of income loss. By contrast, a new wave of social policies
has emerged, which serves a different aim: that of preparing and enhancing
human capital through all stages of the life course, fostering labour market
participation and addressing new social risks (Taylor-Gooby, 2004). Public
investments in daycare services, active labourmarket policies (ALMP), education
and training, follow this logic. As such, they are generally considered to be social
investment-oriented policies (Morel et al., 2012). According to the advocates
of social investment, a balanced mix of the two dimensions – protection and
investment – is the key to building a new welfare state capable of keeping
up with today’s economic and social challenges (Esping-Andersen et al., 2002;
Hemerijck, 2013).
The social investment approach has also served as an analytical tool for
gauging welfare state change. Large-N comparative studies have mostly focused
on the structure of social expenditure, differentiating between spending for ‘old’,
‘compensatory’ social protection, and spending for ‘new’, investment-oriented
policies (Vandenbroucke and Vleminckx, 2011; Nikolai, 2012; Vaalavuo, 2013;
Hemerijck, 2013; Van Vliet and Wang, 2015; Kuitto, 2016). Vandenbroucke and
Vleminckx (2011) showed that, overall, social investment spending increased
across OECD countries from the late 1980s to the pre-crisis years.1 The general
trend, however, conceals wide differences across countries. EUmember states are
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not equally placed with respect to the social investment-orientation of their
welfare states (Nikolai, 2012). Although there is some blurring, the welfare
regimes developed since the work of Esping-Andersen (1990) still help to
define the different spending profiles of European welfare states (Kuitto, 2016).
Nordic countries fall closer to the ideal type of social investment, being big
spenders on both protection- and investment-oriented policies (Huo et al., 2008;
Hemerijck, 2013).Othermember states offer amoremixedpicture. Liberalwelfare
states have favoured the development of some investment-oriented policies
(e.g. activation, education and training) over that of social protection, which
remains comparatively weak (Nikolai, 2012; see also Deeming and Smyth’s [2015]
considerations on the liberal ‘light’ social investment strategy). The opposite
is true for continental EU countries, where spending is biased towards social
protection, and the budgetary space available for social investment is tighter
(Nikolai, 2012).Nevertheless, recent reforms in thedomains ofALMPanddaycare
services have progressively paved the way for elements of social investment (Van
Kersbergen and Hemerijck, 2012). Southern and Eastern European welfare states
stand out as laggards, performing worse both in terms of financing of social
investment-oriented programmes (Nikolai, 2012) and in terms of human capital
and social outcomes (Kvist, 2013).
The expenditure-based approach to the analysis of social investment also
helped to highlight the budgetary trade-offs that are likely to emerge in times
of harsh fiscal constraints. During the years of the Lisbon Strategy, poverty
levels stagnated in spite of the growth of employment. Among the possible
explanations for this puzzle, the so-called ‘resource competition’ hypothesis refers
directly to a trade-off in welfare state budgets (Cantillon, 2011; Vandenbroucke
and Vleminckx, 2011). According to this hypothesis, given scarce resources,
the stress put on employment-centred social investments in the Lisbon years
implied cutting spending for social protection policies, which are deemed to be
more redistributive (although they are not necessarily so in all policy domains:
see Vaalavuo, 2013). Vandenbroucke and Vleminckx’s (2011) findings did not
support the resource competitionhypothesis.Although the shareofpublic budget
taken by social investment-oriented programmes increased, it remained still too
residual to crowd out social protection spending, which also kept on growing.2
Streeck and Mertens (2011) took an opposite view of the same budgetary
trade-off. Their work revealed a decreased capacity of governments to shift
resources at all towards social investments in times of harsh fiscal pressure
(see also Mertens, 2017). To some extent, this reverses the resource competition
hypothesis: it is what they called ‘mandatory’ spending (i.e. the payment of vested
social protection benefits such as pensions) that tends to crowdout ‘discretionary’
social investments. Through a more fine-grained multivariate analysis, Breunig
and Busemeyer (2012) also came to the conclusion that in times of austerity social
investment spending is hit harder than social protection spending.
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Social investment and the Euro crisis
The outbreak of the Euro crisis further tightened the fiscal constraints on
welfare state budgets. As the contagion from the US subprime mortgage crisis
crossed the Atlantic, most EU member states first reacted in an expansionary
fashion, increasing social expenditure to match the augmented unemployment
(Armingeon, 2012). With the outburst of the Greek crisis in late 2009, what had
started as a financial-sector crisis was then perceived as a sovereign-debt crisis.
This marked the shift from (mildly) counter-cyclical policies to fiscal austerity, to
an extent that exceeded that of previous recessions (European Commission,
2013b). Welfare expenditure as a whole, and not only social investment,
became more vulnerable to retrenchment. Although social investment-oriented
programmes appear as easier, less-visible targets for cutbacks, they make up
a very small part of the budget. Reducing social investment expenditure (or
preventing its expansion) has a much smaller effect on reducing the deficits that
exploded as a consequence of bailing out the banks, compared with reducing the
generosity of bigger programmes such as pensions or unemployment benefits.
Long-established social entitlements, considered no longer sustainable, were
increasingly targeted for retrenchment.
The fiscal strain of austerity has not been the only pressure to which
European welfare states have been exposed in the crisis aftermath. An opposite
push came from the social investment strategy promoted by the EU. Taking
on the challenge of making ‘long-term social investment and short-term fiscal
consolidationmutually supportive at both the EU level and in theMember States’
(Vandenbroucke et al., 2011), the social investment strategy indeed represents an
appealing blueprint to help European welfare states pass the crisis stress test.
After a long path, starting with the Lisbon Strategy and boosted by academic
advocacy (Esping-Andersen et al., 2002; Vandenbroucke et al., 2011), theEuropean
Commission launched the Social Investment Package for Growth and Cohesion
in 2013, making explicit the EU’s endorsement of this blueprint (European
Commission, 2013d).
But can such a policy strategy survive the crisis aftershocks? Austerity seems
to have seriously hindered the progress of social investment (Bouget et al.,
2015; Natali and Vanhercke, 2015). However, recent empirical studies reported
contrasting findings. On one side, some highlighted that, at least in northern
and continental Europe, welfare states kept moving towards social investment
in spite of the prima facie priority given to cost-containment policies (Van
Kersbergen et al., 2014). On the other side, the progress of social investment
seemed overwhelmed by austerity and retrenchment, especially in the crisis-
ridden peripheries of the EU (Kvist, 2013; Petmesidou and Guille´n, 2014; Pavolini
et al., 2015). Darker views have gone even further. For example, Pierson (2011: 21;
emphasis added) has raised a question on whether ‘the real era of retrenchment’
has finally begun. Should this be the case, not only would social investments find
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no fiscal leeway to develop, but all welfare spending would be irreversibly rolled
back. That is, the demise of the welfare state instead of its transformation and
relaunch (see also Armingeon, 2013).
Four scenarios for budgetary welfare recalibration
At the crisis crossroads, Europeanwelfare states are cross-pressured by two forces:
the social investment strategy on the one hand, and austerity on the other. At first
sight, two routes seem possible. The crisis could open an unprecedented window
of opportunity for social and economic reforms (Diamond and Liddle, 2012:
286), whose ‘high way’ is indicated by the social investment strategy. Otherwise,
welfare states under strain could give up in the face of mounting pressures for
retrenchment.
Based on the budgetary trade-offs outlined above, a closer inspection goes
beyond such a black-and-white picture. As done in previous research (see section
‘Social investment and welfare states budgets’), we dissect countries’ social
budgets, differentiating between the expenditure for social protection- and social
investment-oriented programmes. The former are cash benefits which provide
income compensation for old industrial social risks. The latter are investments
in services, aimed at enhancing human capital and labour market participation,
and addressing the new social risks that have emerged in post-industrial societies.
By crossing these two fundamental dimensions of the new welfare state, we get a
better understanding of all possible trajectories viable for welfare recalibration.
Countries can either increase or decrease the budgetary effort they put into
each of the two dimensions. This gives four possible scenarios for the budgetary
recalibration of European welfare states, as shown in Table 1.
The four scenarios provide an analytical framework for interpreting welfare
state change. Eachof themmatcheswithdifferent normative views and theoretical
expectations that have been proposed in the literature. In the top-right quadrant,
the resources put into both welfare state dimensions (social protection and social
investment) are increased: a positive-sum solution which we call the ‘high road
to social investment’ (scenario 1). In the view of its advocates, an ideal turn to
social investment arguably occurs when governments increase the effort they
put into social investment more than into social protection, shifting the balance
from compensatory cash benefits to preventative investments (Hemerijck, 2013).
In a context of scarce financial resources, the expansion of social investment-
oriented policies could nevertheless take all the fiscal space available, crowding
out spending for ‘costly’ social protection functions such as unemployment
benefits. This is depicted in the bottom-right quadrant of Table 1 (scenario 2)
and reflects the trade-off highlighted in the ‘resource competition’ hypothesis
(Cantillon, 2011; Vandenbroucke and Vlaminckx, 2011): the budgetary effort on
social investment again increases, but that on social protection falls. The opposite
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TABLE 1. Four scenarios for the budgetary
recalibration of European welfare states
is true in the top-left quadrant: the ‘reversed resource competition’ scenario (3).
Here it is the budgetary effort put into social protection that increases, to the
detriment of social investments. Given tight budget constraints, the financial
weight of enduring policy legacies (welfare entitlements politically anchored in
vested interests) could leave no room for investing in new policies (Streeck and
Mertens, 2011; Breunig and Busemeyer, 2012). Last, we find the scenario of ‘social
retrenchment’ (4), in which both social investment and social protection are
rolled back. This latter scenario matches with the darkest view about a real age
of austerity which is just getting started now, with the Great Recession (Pierson,
2011; Armingeon, 2013).
Data and methodology
The skeleton of social investment revisited
To frame it as De Deken (2014) did, this article maps ‘the skeleton of the
social investment welfare state’ in public budgets.3 Previous research highlighted
the usefulness of disaggregating total welfare expenditure into separate functions,
which were found to be determined by different politico-institutional factors and
in turn associated with different socio-economic outcomes (Castles, 2009; Van
Vliet andWang, 2015).Many empirical studies have re-aggregated social spending
categories to fit the social investment perspective (see the two previous sections),
bringing new empirical and analytical insight to our knowledge of the social
investment welfare state.
The expenditure-based approach has pros and cons (a critical review is
provided by De Deken, 2014), and some limitations are unavoidable. A first
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limitation regards the general question of how to measure welfare state change
(Clasen and Siegel, 2007). By looking at spending data, researchers can only grasp
the budgetary weight of social policies but not the institutional characteristics
of such programmes. It is, however, exactly the cost of social policies that gains
political salience in times of fiscal consolidation (Mertens, 2017), bringing to
light the budgetary trade-offs that are a crucial focus of this article. A second
limitation is specific to the operationalisation of social investment through social
expenditure. The distinction between ‘social investment’ and ‘social protection’
spending items is often blurred; many policies in fact serve both aims (De Deken,
2014; Nolan, 2013).4 The uncertain categorisation of social programmes largely
derives from the same conceptual ambiguity of social investment: a strong point
for policy-makers who use it as a political platform (Jenson, 2017: 4), but a hurdle
for researchers interested in using it as analytical framework (Nolan, 2013). Given
this (intentional) ambiguity, any agreement on a fixed operationalisation will
hardly ever be reached.
Aware of its shortcomings, my analysis builds on the disaggregated
expenditure approach. The proposed methodology differs from the bulk of
those used previously in two respects: the choice of the data source and
the (expanded) allocation of social spending functions over the two welfare
dimensions. While most studies of social investment spending have relied on the
OECD Social Expenditure Database (SOCX), my methodological effort builds
on expenditure data from various Eurostat sources, as provided in the SIWE data
set (Ronchi, 2016).5 Eurostat sources include: the European System of integrated
Social PROtection Statistics (ESSPROS), Eurostat Labour Market Policy (LMP)
statistics, and Eurostat data on education and research and development (R&D).
The SIWE data cover all member states except Croatia (instead of 21 member
states included in OECD-SOCX) and provide more complete time series for the
time span considered in this article. In spite of some differences in data collection
(seeAdemaandLadaique, 2009), thedegree of disaggregation reachedbyEurostat
is comparable to that of OECD-SOCX. As done in previous contributions, we
take into account gross public expenditure: data on net spending do not reach
such a fine-grained level of disaggregation.6
As for the allocation of social spending functions over distinct welfare
dimensions, we also use the heuristic dichotomy which differentiates between
social protection spending and social investment spending (hereafter SP and
SI). Nevertheless, we modify and expand the expenditure-based methodology.
Previous studies have mostly categorised spending items based on the rationale
of different policies. However, policies can followmultiple rationales (De Deken,
2014; see note 4): this leads to ample margins of discretion when allocating items
towelfare dimensions.Hence,wedifferentiate betweenSP andSI by looking at the
way in which different programmes are provided: cash benefits are considered
as SP, benefits in kind (services) as SI. This grants a more objective criterion
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without neglecting the policy rationale aspect: cash benefits in fact provide
ex-post-compensation for ‘old’ risks (hence, a social protection rationale), while
investment-oriented policies generally come as services (Ahn and Kim, 2015).
As shown in Appendix 1 (see Supplementary material), SP includes passive
labour market policies (PLMP), cash benefits for families with children and old-
age benefits. ALMP, care services for families with children and for the aged,
public spending for education (from primary to post-secondary non-tertiary)
and research and development (R&D) are counted in SI. This categorisation
departs from the bulk of previous studies in three ways: (1) Contrary to what is
usually done, healthcare spending is not incorporated in the SP dimension:
we exclude it from the dichotomy. Healthcare is a very ambiguous welfare
function that does not exclusively fit either of the two categories suggested.
As opposed to the rest of the SP functions, healthcare is generally not based
on cash transfers but on the provision of services that both compensate for the
occurrence of health problems, and (re-)capacitate those in need.Hence, the dual
protection-investment aim appears especially marked here.Moreover, in the case
of healthcare, expenditure is a particularly bad indicator of government effort (see
e.g. Wilkerson, 2003). (2) Following Streeck and Mertens (2011) and Beramendi
and his colleagues (2015), I expand the SI dimension by including public spending
for R&D. Investing in R&D is in fact part and parcel of a SI strategy centred on
human capital in a knowledge-based economy, and was among the targets of the
Lisbon Strategy. (3) The categorisation of parental leave policies as either SI or
SP is a contested issue (De Deken, 2014). Although I classify them as SP (insofar
as they consist of cash benefits), considering them as SI did not alter the findings
shown in the results section below.
Country sample and time span
The recalibration of welfare state budgets is observed for all EU-27 countries
(Croatia is excluded due to missing values). Countries are grouped into the most
commonly used clusters (for a review, see Ferragina and Seeleib-Kaiser, 2011).
Welfare regimes are used as a reference point to indicate the different policy
legacies which exist across the EU. That is, the institutional ‘starting blocks’
of very different member states now called to embark on the road to social
investment.
The time spanobserved in this study is 2000–2014. The analysis first compares
the average levels for the years 2000–2008 with those for the aftermath of the
crisis (2009-2014), and then narrows the focus to the post-crisis dynamics only.
2009 is taken as the watershed year between the period of overall economic
growth of the early 2000s and the crisis ‘rainy days’.7 After 2009, the bulk of EU
countries shifted to pro-cyclical fiscal policies (European Commission, 2013b).
Fiscal austerity could in fact havedrastically altered the budgetary trends observed
in the early days of the Lisbon Strategy.
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Budgetary welfare effort
We focus on the levels and changes of ‘budgetary welfare effort’ (BWE):
a measure of the effective financial effort that governments put into the two
highlighted dimensions of the welfare state. Raw figures on welfare expenditure
over the GDP are not very explanatory in this respect. Both the numerator
and denominator are susceptible to economic downturns as well as to the
demographic structure of (ageing) populations; contextual factors that have
nothing to do with the actual government effort.8 Therefore, we analyse social
expenditure trends in volumes, expressed in purchasing power standard (PPS)
for the EU-28 at constant prices (base year: 2005), and weighted for the target
population of the selected social programmes. This adjusts expenditures for the
extent of the respective social needs in a given country-year. For each welfare
function, the BWE comes net of distortions due to fluctuations of the business
cycle or of the structure and the needs of the population. The general formula
for the construction of BWE indicators is the following:
BWE = Euros spent on a given welfare function
target population of that given function
The formula tells us how many Euros (in PPS) a country spends on average per
potential beneficiary for a given welfare function.9 The target populations used
in the calculation are the unemployed population for working-age functions
(labour market programmes), and the respective population sub-groups for the
other welfare functions (0–4 years for family/children programmes, 5–19 years
for education, over 64 years for old-age programmes, and the total population
for R&D, since the latter is expected to produce economies of scale benefiting the
whole community).
Two composite indices for SP and SI are finally computed taking the
standardised mean scores of the BWE indicators for the functions included in
each of the two welfare dimensions. The mean and standard deviation used for
the standardisation are obtained from the full sample, pooling all country-years.
Results: welfare state budgets in motion
Based on the trends of the two composite BWE indices for SP and SI
introduced above, this section places EUwelfare states in the scenarios for welfare
recalibration. The detailed trends that underlie the following figures are found
in Appendix 2 (see Supplementary material), which also shows the BWEs for
each policy field composing the SI and SP indices. Figure 1 plots member states
according to their crossed SI and SP scores. The markers indicate the average
pre-crisis BWE scores (2000-2008), and the arrows indicate the change from the
pre-crisis to the post-crisis average (2009-2014).
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Figure 1. Budgetary Welfare Efforts: pre-crisis levels and directions of change.
Let us first look at the pre-crisis levels. EU countries seem to align with a
positive linear correlation: more generous welfare states that score higher on SP
also score higher on SI. The dashed vertical lines mark the limits of three clusters
obtained through a simple hierarchical cluster analysis (Ward’s linkage method)
conducted on the single BWE-SI variable for the pre-crisis averages. Although
welfare regimes ‘still feature differing spending profiles with respect to both the
relation of social investment and social [protection] measures’ (Kuitto, 2016:
452), they appear to be a bit blurred here. The blurring is in line with previous
research based on raw expenditure-over-GDP data, which pointed out that –
since themid-2000s – ‘traditional regime analysis no longer represent[ed] a valid
framework for contemporary analysis’ (Nikolai, 2012: 110). This depends on the
different perspective from which we look at the welfare state. While Esping-
Andersen’s (1990) traditional clusters were based on the generosity of social
insurance programmes, the expenditure-based approach loses some information
on the institutional characteristics of cash benefits, but adds variation along
another dimension which has become increasingly relevant: that of SI, which not
always perfectly matches the welfare generosity profile.
Denmark and Sweden stand out as champions of SI. The other social-
democratic country – Finland – falls closer to the conservative block. By contrast,
theNetherlands places itself in the high-SI cluster, althoughwith higher SP scores.
Austria follows the Netherlands very closely. A scattered picture emerges in the
middle part of the plot, where liberal and the remaining conservative welfare
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states are mixed, followed soon after by the bigger Southern welfare states (Italy,
Spain and Portugal) and Slovenia. The bottom-left part of the plot includes the
rest of the SI laggards: the remaining Southern countries and the new Eastern
member states; the latter with the lowest scores on both dimensions.
The arrows in Figure 1 indicate the direction of change: the shift from the pre-
to the post-crisis average scores. Almost all arrows point towards an expansion of
the BWE, especially in the direction of SI. However, starting levels seem tomatter.
With the exception of Italy, Southern and Eastern laggards seem to be undergoing
a (moderate) catch-up process on both SI and SP. Themore spectacular catch-ups
are nevertheless found among those welfare states that already fall closer to the SI
champions. Austria, Germany and Finland have reduced the gap in the SI score
with Denmark and Sweden. By contrast, the Netherlands seems to have gone
against the tide, retrenching ‘from above’. Although starting from comparatively
very high levels, it decreased the BWE on both SI and SP.
Figure 2(a) presents the changes, plotting the countries according to the
difference between post- and pre-crisis average BWE scores. This allows a direct
match of member states with the scenarios presented in Table 1. Over the whole
period examined (2000-2014), almost all member states successfully increased
their BWE put into SI. This matches Kuitto’s (2016) observation with regards
to pre-crisis spending-over-the-GDP trends. Most countries place themselves in
the ‘high road’ scenario (1), having increased BWE on both welfare dimensions
(although to different degrees). The second scenario includes countries in which
gains in the budgetary effort on SI have been achieved to the detriment of
SP – the ‘resource competition scenario’ (2). The progress of SI seems to have
partly crowded out SP only in the cases of Sweden, Denmark and – to a lesser
extent – Austria. However, it has to be noted that all countries that reduced their
budgetary effort in SP (those below the x-axis) did so starting from comparatively
high levels. In a way, they seem to have reached a sort of upper bound for SP.
Despite the direction taken, their welfare states are still among themost generous
in terms of SP. Alone in the scenario of ‘reversed resource competition’ (3), Italy
behaved the other way around, increasing its effort into SP while reducing its
effort into SI. Indeed, the literature refers to Italy as the exception in the European
SI framework, with a welfare legacy biased towards SP, and no progress made in
SI during the Lisbon years (Hemerijck, 2013: 264; Leo´n and Pavolini, 2014). The
Netherlands stands out in the ‘social retrenchment’ scenario (4). By and large,
this reflects Van Kersbergen et al.’s (2014) considerations of the retrenchment
component which has characterised recent Dutch welfare reforms. As stressed
above, starting levels matter: the Netherlands remains in any case one of themost
generous and SI-oriented welfare states.
In the light of the austerity turn that followed the Euro crisis, the positive
picture which emerges when comparing average pre-crisis to post-crisis levels
can however be overly optimistic. The catch-up process that manymember states
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Figure 2. Member States placed into the four scenarios. Based on: (a) the change from the
launch of the Lisbon Strategy to the crisis aftermath; (b) the post-crisis change only.
undertook during the Lisbon years could have slowed down after the crisis, and
budgetary trade-offs worsened: an aspect that we cannot grasp from Figure 2a.
To unveil the crisis aftershocks, we narrow the focus to the post-crisis period
only. Figure 2b places member states into the same scenarios mentioned above,
but this time their positions are based on changes in BWE from 2009 to 2014.
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After 2009, the growth in BWE on both SP and SI came to a halt, and even
reversed in some countries.With the exception of Denmark, all countries slipped
towards the scenarios of resource competition (2) and social retrenchment (4).
While in the Lisbon years only the most generous welfare states reduced their
effort in the SP dimension (Figure 2a), retrenching SP became the rule after
the crisis, regardless of starting levels. To some extent, this comes as no surprise.
Even though they are protectedby vested interestswhichmake their retrenchment
politically difficult (Streeck and Mertens, 2011), SP programmes take the largest
share of public budgets. As such, they became the primary target for reducing
the deficits that exploded during the financial crisis. Especially in the crisis-
ridden peripheries of the EU, budget constraints became tighter after the crisis.
As evident in Figure 2b, austerity not onlymade it harder to invest in new policies
but it also directly hit established SP programmes (Petmesidou andGuille´n, 2014;
Natali and Vanhercke, 2015; Pavolini et al., 2015).
The most worrying signal for the SI strategy is the presence of eleven
countries in the bottom-left quadrant of Figure 2b; eleven countries in which
the effort on both SP and SI was rolled back. In the crisis aftermath, social
retrenchment rather than investment became an option. Where governments
continued instead to expand their BWE on SI, budgetary trade-offs became
unavoidable (see the 12 countries in the bottom-right quadrant of Figure 2b). In
the post-crisis context of harsher fiscal consolidation, mild expansions of (less
costly) SI programmes had to happen to the detriment of the SP programmes,
which resulted in reduced budgetary effort.
The worries concerning resource competition are confirmed by Figure 3,
which shows the average BWE trends of SI and SP for the whole EU-27. The
synthetic indices have been recomputed taking the year 2000 as a baseline (i.e. the
mean and standard deviation for the standardisation are those of 2000, fixed, so as
to track the average over-time trends). This clearly shows that, while SP kept pace
with thebudgetary expansionof SI up to the crisis outbreak, thepicturedrastically
changed after 2009. On average, the progress of SI slowed down considerably,
almost stagnating. Meanwhile, that of SP plummeted: the (average) gap between
the twowelfare dimensions increased, reflecting the resource competition pattern
that materialised in many countries.
Conclusion and discussion
According to a growing academic advocacy, the social investment strategy should
serve to overcome the fiscal pressures put by the crisis on European welfare states,
reconciling today’s economic and social urgencies (Vandenbroucke et al., 2011).
However, not all European welfare states are placed on the same starting blocks.
Notably, while Nordic countries fall close to the ideal type of the SI welfare
state, other member states (especially Southern and Eastern) lag behind with
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Figure 3. Average trends of Budgetary Welfare Efforts on SI and SP for the EU-27 (2000 = 0).
respect to many dimensions. The Great Recession has then come to threaten
the fiscal viability of SI: after the Euro crisis broke, austerity carried the day,
further constraining social budgets. Based on Eurostat data, and on a fine-
grained measure of needs-adjusted budgetary effort, this article has assessed
the trajectories taken by the recalibration of EU welfare states from the launch of
the Lisbon Strategy to the crisis aftermath (2000-2014).
The results show that the crisis has indeed put the brake on the progress
that SI had made in member states’ social budgets during the Lisbon years.
This contrasts with the positive pattern highlighted by previous studies, which
focused on data preceding the Euro crisis aftershocks (Vandenbroucke and
Vleminckx, 2011; Hemerijck, 2013; Kuitto, 2016). On the other hand, the results
that have emerged in this article are in line with the conclusions reached by
recent qualitative policy analyses on social investment and welfare reforms in the
EU (Petmesidou and Guille´n, 2014; Bouget et al., 2015; Natali and Vanhercke,
2015). Still, as testified by the position of most EU countries in the ‘high road to
SI’ scenario in Figure 2a, in the great majority of member states the budgetary
progress made since the outset of the Lisbon Strategy has not been jeopardised,
at least up to 2014. That is, the crisis has brought a widespread slowdown of the
budgetary progress of SI, but not (yet) a U-turn.
However, contrary to what seemed to be the case before the crisis
(Vandenbroucke and Vleminckx, 2011), resource competition has become a
matter of concern during the crisis aftershocks. This poses a politically salient
trade-off for governments, whose room for manoeuvre has further tightened
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over recent years. Politicians interested in expansionary welfare recalibration for
electoral reasonswouldmost likelyhave to choose either to expand theprotection-
or the investment-oriented policy dimension, but not both. When pursued at
all, a budgetary expansion of SI in the context of post-crisis austerity appears
possible only while retrenching SP, which comes at an electoral cost. Whether
this is just a temporary shock or the start of a ‘real age of austerity’ (Pierson, 2011)
remains to be seen. To date, it seems at least reasonable to raise doubts about
the budgetary viability of what we called ‘the high road to social investment’ for
crisis-ridden countries.
Some considerations arise with regards to the dynamics of EU welfare states’
change. When looking at both levels and the change of budgetary welfare efforts
(spending in volumes per potential beneficiary), traditional welfare state regimes
getmorenuanced.Differentwelfare legaciesdonot seemtochannel social budgets
into predetermined tracks. A catch-up process is underway on the SI dimension,
although it is more pronounced in the better-placed continental economies (e.g.
Germany and Austria), whose distance from the Nordic champions of SI was less
marked from the beginning.
From an analytical point of view, the SI perspective, together with its
critiques, has provided useful tools for looking at welfare state change. The
scenarios we have built for interpreting our empirical findings offer an analytical
framework that can also be useful for further research to identify different
trajectories of welfare recalibration, and to ground them theoretically in the
literature. Thewide variation in theplacement of different countries intodifferent
scenarios suggests the presence of a multitude of factors behind welfare state
change. Unveiling the institutional, political and economic determinants of SI
will be a crucial task for future contributions. Moreover, the overall trends of SI
and SP shown here conceal variation in the trajectories taken by different policy
fields. For example, increases in the budgetary effort put into the general SP
dimension often conceal retrenchment of working-age protection policies (i.e. a
decrease of the BWE indicator for the working-age function: see Appendix 2 in
the supplementary material). Research on specific policy fields can sharpen our
understanding of the development of different SI strategies.
This article focused on the budgetary side of SI; one side of a multi-faceted
variable. The question is then whether, in a context of budgetary disinvestment,
SI could flourish anyway and deliver the wished-for socio-economic outcomes.
This depends not only upon a successful recalibration of social budgets but
also on a more efficient use of the (scarcer) resources deployed, as well as on the
institutional and economic context ofmember states that differ greatly from each
other. The challenge of the SI strategy gets arguably harder to take up, especially
for those countries which have not invested in new social policies so far, and are
now facing adverse economic conditions. Based on the findings in this article,
we cannot exclude the possibility that, while better-off countries will keep to the
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well-trodden ‘high road’, those that had just started to catch up during the Lisbon
years will stop or even reverse their progress, having no fiscal leeway to pursue SI
at all, or opting for a lighter variant in which SP is left behind (cf. Deeming and
Smyth, 2015).
Supplementary material
To view supplementary material for this article, please visit https://doi.org/
10.1017/S0047279417000782
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Notes
1 Despite its increase, social investment spending still takes a residual part of welfare
budgets compared to old protection policies (most notably pensions). Vandenbroucke and
Vleminckx’s analysis goes up to the years 2005–2007, and includes 13 EU countries. Kuitto
(2016) obtained similar results for the period 2000 to 2010, with spending data (as share of
GDP) on 23 European countries, and data on benefit generosity for 14 countries.
2 Hudson and Kuhner (2009) and Van Vliet andWang (2015) reached similar conclusions with
bigger country samples, again on pre-crisis trends. Kuitto’s (2016) results in respect to the
resource competition hypothesis are more mixed.
3 The quote is originally taken from the work of the Austrian sociologist Rudolf Goldscheid,
‘Staatssozialismus und Staatskapitalismus’, as restated by Josef Schumpeter: ‘The budget is
the skeleton of the state stripped of all misleading ideologies’.
4 For example, parental leaves can be seen both as protection, insofar as they consist of out-of-
work benefits which suspend (and in some cases can even hurt) labour market participation,
and as investment, in that they aim to reconcile work and family life, providing an incentive
to have children in the European context of low fertility.
5 The SIWE dataset is available from the author’s website (https://sronchi.wordpress.com/
siwe-data-set/). The STATA syntax to replicate the results can be sent upon request.
6 As discussed in De Deken (2014), the use of gross instead of net spending could overestimate
social protection expenditure in countries which tax benefits (e.g. Nordic countries), while
underestimating the extent of welfare effort when this largely relies on tax breaks (e.g. UK
and Ireland, but also many continental and Southern EU countries for child allowances).
In-work tax credits are included in the SIWE dataset.
7 In the years from 2000 to 2008, with very few exceptions, the economies of all member
states grew. The average EU-28 annual real GDP growth reached its peak in 2006 with
+3.4 percentage points over the previous year. In 2008 growth slowed down. In 2009, all
EU-28 economies (with the exception of Poland) shrank considerably, with an average of
–4.4 negative GDP growth. In the following two years, overall, the feeble recovery did not
compensate for the ground lost, and the recession struck again in 2012 (Eurostat online
database, accessed February 2017).
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8 The most fitting example for the excessive business cycle-sensitivity of spending-over-the-
GDP figures is that of unemployment benefits: the numerator (spending on benefits) tends
to react counter-cyclically, increasing during recessions as a consequence of the increased
number of claimants. In contrast, the denominator (GDP) decreases when the economy
falls into recession. This leads to an overestimation of budgetary welfare effort in times of
economic crisis, that is, the scope of this inquiry.
9 Contrary to Vandenbroucke and Vleminckx (2011), we do not compare BWE indicators with
GDP per capita. This would make those indicators vulnerable to the same pitfalls discussed
above for spending-over-the-GDP measures (for example, BWE could become higher in
Greece just because the denominator – GDP per capita – goes down). Spending in volumes
expressed in PPS provides the same degree of cross-country comparability.
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